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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1983, the Florida Senate submitted Senate Bill 1017,1 a legislative proposal designed to alleviate the escalating medical malpractice
"crisis ' and to allay the fears of the medical community.' The Bill
included a proposal to eliminate the doctrine of joint and several liability in causes of action where comparative negligence applied.4 All. FLA. S. 1017 (Reg. Sess. 1983, introduced by Sen. Kirkpatrick). The Senate bill was a
comprehensive scheme relating to civil and insurance actions, the majority with respect to professional insurance and professional liability.
2. Increasing numbers of medical malpractice actions coupled with escalating insurance
rates for physicians brought cries from the medical profession to implement serious reforms in
Florida tort law. See Malpractice Suits Make Medicine A Tough Business, Gainesville Sun,
Dec. 18, 1982, § A, at 1, col. 4; Feinstein, Medical-MalpracticeIlls Call for New Treatment,
Miami Herald, Dec. 12, 1982, § E at 3, col. 1.
3. The medical malpractice controversy has engendered an enormous, albeit anticipated,
amount of debate. See, e.g., Malpractice: The Furor Rages On, Gainesville Sun, Dec. 18, 1982,
§ A, at 1, col. 1; The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Self-Preservation of a Privileged Class:
An Analysis of the Florida Medical Association's Proposals to Further Insulate Medical Doctors
from Liability for Malpractice (1982) (unpublished report).
4. If passed, this portion of Senate Bill 1017 would have created FLA. STAT. § 768.36(1)(4) entitled "Comparative negligence; elimination of joint and several liability." The pertinent
provisions read as follows:
(3) In any action in which the trier of fact finds that more than one person is negligent, each person shall be liable for only that proportion of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages which his causal negligence bears to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all persons involved in the occurrence giving rise to the action.
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though Senate Bill 1017 overwhelmingly passed in the Senate, it died
in the House. 5 The proposal was Florida's most recent attempt to
resolve the problems created by the joint and several liability doctrine. The most troublesome issue is determining who should bear
the burden of an uncollectible portion of a judgment where a contributorily negligent plaintiff and multiple tortfeasors are involved.
While Senate Bill 1017 represents a legislative attempt to redress
these problems the proposal falls short of a comprehensive response
to the loss allocation dilemma which has traditionally plagued the
doctrine of joint and several liability. The legislature instead should
consider adopting provisions similar to those of the newly promulgated Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
This note will examine both the legal and practical ramifications
of Senate Bill 1017. After a brief analysis of the doctrine of joint and
several liability and its subsequent modification under the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the interaction between comparative negligence and multiple tortfeasors will be examined. Next,
the policy arguments both supporting and disfavoring enactment of
the proposed legislation will be considered. Finally, this note will endorse legislation in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act.
II. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS

The doctrine of joint and several liability enjoys a well-established place in Florida case law.' The doctrine provides that when a
judgment is rendered against two or more defendants for negligence,
each defendant becomes jointly and severally liable for the total
amount of damages. That is, the plaintiff may recover the entire
amount against any single defendant. Originally, the doctrine applied
only to those instances in which two or more persons had acted "in
concert" to produce a single injury to the plaintiff.7 The courts gradually extended the doctrine to circumstances where the concurrent
(4) This section applies to all causes of action pending on the effective date of this
act wherein the doctrine of comparative negligence applies and to cases thereafter filed.
FLA. S. 1017 (Reg. Sess. 1983, introduced by Sen. Kirkpatrick).
5. Senator George Kirkpatrick had originally introduced a bill which would have eliminated the doctrine of joint and several liability altogether. Senate Bill 240 was postponed, however, and finally withdrawn. FLAs. S. 240 (Reg. Sess. 1983, introduced by Sen. Kirkpatrick).
6. See Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936); Fincher Motor Sales v. Lakin,
156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963). For an analysis of the history and theories of joint and
several liability, see Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 Tax. L. RE v. 399 (1939) and
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. Rav. 413 (1937).
7. See Prosser, supra note 6, at 414-18.
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actions of two or more persons acting independently combined to
produce a single injury to the plaintiff.'
One of the most problematic aspects of the application of joint
and several liability is apportioning fault among various defendants
relative to their respective negligence. Three basic situations arise
with respect to independent concurrent tortfeasors. In the first situation, the actions of any one of the defendants would have theoretically produced the whole of the plaintiff's injury irrespective of the
other defendants' negligence. 10 In this circumstance, logic and fairness dictate the retention of joint and several liability. Since each
defendant's negligent act could have caused the plaintiff's entire injury, requiring one defendant to bear the entire loss imposes the
same liability he would have had if he had acted alone.
The second situation arises when the independent actions of two
or more tortfeasors combine to produce a single injury that could not
have occurred absent the combination.1 1 In other words, none of the
tortfeasors' actions alone would have produced injury, but together
caused the plaintiff harm. The policy reasons for retaining joint and
several liability in this instance are slightly different than those in
the first situation. Although the risk factor created by each defendant
alone in this circumstance is negligible, the combined risks result in
harm. Full exoneration of liability, however, would leave the innocent
plaintiff without compensation for his injury. Percentage apportionment of liability is impractical in this instance, however, due to the
difficulty of isolating and quantifying the tortfeasors fault. Therefore,
each defendant must necessarily bear the risk of the entire injury if
the plaintiff is to be made whole. 2
8. Id.
9. For an extensive discussion on these three situations, see Zavos, Comparative Fault
and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and Amplification of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 775, 783-86 (1981).
10. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 692-714 (1956). In these three situations, the wrongdoers are referred to as "independent, concurrent tortfeasors." Id. at 693.
11. Florida case law has provided that independent wrongs may be committed by different persons and subsequently merge into a single tort. Sands v. Wilson, 140 Fla. 18, 21, 191 So.
21, 22 (1939). This doctrine was perhaps based upon the assumption that because the injury
was indivisible, damages could not appropriately be apportioned. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF TORTS § 433A (1976); Zavos, supra note 9, at 785. With the advent of comparative fault and
its consequent apportionment of liability, however, this rationale no longer holds true. A better
analysis, from this author's perspective, is to regard the retention of joint and several liability
as a benefit to the non-culpable, injured plaintiff.
12. Joint and several liability is inapplicable in Florida when one tort only aggravates the
consequential injury of a prior tort, provided the plaintiff's injury is capable of "apportionment." See Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv. v. Millens, 294 So. 2d 38 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied,
302 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1974). The fallacy of this concept is realized when one considers the difficulty of "dividing" at all the effects of a single injury. Rather, the emphasis should be placed on
each defendant's conduct in determining proportionate fault with respect to damage division.
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The third situation occurs when the trial court determines that
each defendant is responsible only for a certain percentage of the
plaintiff's injury.1 " The application of joint and several liability is

clearly inequitable when a defendant adjudicated 10 percent negligent is forced to bear 100 percent of the damages. Under these circumstances, joint and several liability has been highly criticized. The
remainder of this note will focus on this third situation within the
context of the doctrine of comparative negligence.
Ill.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

Florida courts traditionally held that when a plaintiff contributed
to those injuries for which he was seeking compensation, his cause of
action would be barred completely. 14 This principle, known as contributory negligence, 5 assumed that if the plaintiff himself created a
risk that led to his subsequent injury, he should not be compensated
by others,"' regardless of their fault. In 1973, the Florida Supreme
Court 17 abrogated the harsh contributory negligence doctrine in favor

of the more equitable doctrine of comparative negligence. 8
13. See Zavos, supra note 9, at 793.
14. Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21
Fla. 700 (1886).
15. The majority of states have abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence as a bar
to recovery. See UNri. ComARATivE FAULT AcT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1984) (Commissioners'
Prefatory Note). See also Note, Ohio's ComparativeNegligence Statute: The Effect on Joint
and Several Liability, Absent Defendants and Joinder,50 U. CIN. L. REV. 342, 342 n.1 (1981).
16. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 417-22 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Florida was the first state to judicially
adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence. Since then five states, Alaska, California, Michigan, Tennessee and West Virginia, have followed Florida's precedent. See Note, supra note 15,
at 342 n.1.
For an analysis of Florida's judicial activism, see Timmons & Sflvas, Pure Comparative
Negligence in Florida:A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 737 (1974).
18. Comparative negligence allows the claimant to recover even though he himself may
have been negligent. Thus, if a plaintiff is found to be 30% negligent, he can only recover 70%
of his damages from the defendant. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973);
Whorley v. Brewer, 315 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975).
All comparative negligence systems reduce the plaintiff's amount of recovery by his proportionate negligence. See supra note 16. Consonant with the principles expounded in Hoffman v.
Jones, Florida courts apply a system of "pure" comparative negligence; that is, the plaintiff
need not be less negligent than the defendant to recover from him.
Modified systems, as opposed to "pure" systems, diminish the plaintiff's recovery if his
proportionate negligence exceeds a specified percentage. By far these are the more popular systems. The rationale being that inequity results when the plaintiff is permitted to recover from a
defendant less negligent than himself. Fleming, Foreward: Comparative Negligence at Law By JudicialChoice, 64 CALIF.L. Rnv. 239, 246 (1976). Under a slight/gross system, the plaintiff
may recover if his negligence is "slight" compared to the defendant's. The percentage systems,
however, have been enacted by a majority of jurisdictions allowing for comparative fault. Under
the 50%/50% version, the plaintiff may recover if his negligence was less than or equal to that
of the defendants. Under 49%/51% systems, the plaintiff may only recover if his negligence is
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The crucial debate within the doctrine of joint and several liability occurs in the comparative negligence context. 19 Florida law has
retained joint and several liability even when the plaintiff has contributed to his own injuries.20 To illustrate: plaintiff is 40 percent
negligent, and two defendants are each found to be 30 percent negligent. Under the doctrine of joint and several liability,2 plaintiff may
still recover 60 percent of his total damages from either defendant he
chooses. To ameliorate the harsh effect of one defendant bearing the
entire judgment irrespective of other equally culpable defendants,
the Florida legislature enacted the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (Contribution Act).22 The Act provides for fiscal con"less than" that of the defendant's. Supra note 16.
19. Curiously, Senate Bill 10J.7 provides only for elimination of joint and several liability
when the plaintiff is comparatively negligent. FLA. S. 1017 (Reg. Sess. 1983, introduced by Sen.
Kirkpatrick). The Florida Medical Association requested a very different provision, calling for
the total elimination of joint and several liability. Because very few medical malpractice cases
will occur in which the claimant has contributed to his own injuries, the FMA's advocacy is
understandable, if somewhat unpersuasive. See Board Rejects FMA Package, Adopts Gunter's
Proposals, Florida Bar News, Apr. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 1. For a comprehensive critique on malpractice schemes, see Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A
Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18:1 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS.

143 (1981).

20. In Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 392 (Fla. 1975), the Florida Supreme Court in
dictum found the doctrine of joint and several liability applied even in cases involving comparative negligence. The Lincenberg court apparently construed the newly enacted contribution
statute as codifying joint and several liability. See Comment, Contribution Act Construed Should Joint and Several Liability Have Been Considered First?, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 747,
756-57 (1976). This interpretation was later upheld in Moore v. St. Cloud Utils., 337 So. 2d 982
(4th D.C.A.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1976) and Department of Transp. v. Webb, 409
So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).
21. The confused analysis of the interaction between joint and several liability in the
Lincenberg decision is perhaps better understood in light of the lower court's perspective. The
issue arose because the Lincenberg defendant claimed that the doctrine of comparative negligence applied to cases involving a non-culpable plaintiff, as in the instant case. The defendant
argued comparative negligence applied in cases involving multiple tortfeasors as well and required each party to bear only his proportionate share of liability. 318 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla.
1975). The trial judge certified the issue to the Third District Court of Appeal which held
comparative negligence inapplicable to the instant case and further denied contribution as expressly forbidden by Florida case law. 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). By the time the
supreme court heard the case, the Contribution Act had already passed. FLA. STAT. § 768.31
(1975). Although the supreme court was simply following the provisions of a recently enacted
statute, the opinion seemed to judicially mandate contribution among tortfeasors. The court
never adequately addressed the issue of comparative negligence within the doctrine of joint and
several liability. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
22. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1981). The Contribution Act was enacted pursuant to the 1955
draft of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act promulgated by the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. UNIF. CoNramuTmoN AMONG ToRTFEAsoRs AcT (1955
Revision), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). By 1983, twenty jurisdictions had adopted the Uniform Contribution Act in its entirety without substantial modification. 12 U.L.A. 59 (Supp. 1984). By 1981,
only eight jurisdictions had no form of contribution among multiple tortfeasors. See H. WOODS,
CoMPARATIvE FAULT

421 app. (1978), 127 app. (Supp. 1981).
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tribution among tortfeasors in accordance with the respective percentage of each defendant's negligence.2 3 Thus, in this example, if the
plaintiff recovers 60 percent of his total damages from one defendant,
that defendant may recover 30 percent from his co-defendant.2 4 The
Contribution Act, however, has not abrogated the doctrine of joint
and several liability.2 5 If, for example, one of the defendants is judgment proof,26 the remaining defendant must bear the entire damage
award regardless of his proportionate fault. The inequity is obvious;
the plaintiff may recover 60 percent of his damages from a defendant
who was only 30 percent negligent and who created a risk factor that
is proportionately less than that created by the plaintiff himself.
The policy reasons supporting this seemingly inequitable result
stem from a societal perception of the plaintiff/defendant dichotomy.27 The defendant is seen as the culprit who has injured another.
Although the plaintiff has also been negligent, he perhaps has
harmed only himself. Reducing plaintiff's recovery by his proportionate negligence purportedly resolves this dilemma.28 With multiple
tortfeasors, however, the defendant, by virtue of his status alone,
must bear the remaining percentage of the judgment regardless of his
23. The original Contribution Act enacted by the Florida legislature in 1975 specifically
prohibited any consideration of proportionate liability. Section 768.31(3) (a) read: "In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability- (a) Their relative degrees of fault
shall not be considered." FLA. STAT. 768.31(3)(a) (1975). Amended in 1976, the current statute
now provides that "relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability." FLA.
STAT. 768.31(3)(a) (1983).
For an extensive and critical analysis of Florida case law interpreting the Contribution Act,
see Coffey, ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors: A Florida Case Law Survey and Analysis,
35 U. MIA L. REv. 971 (1981) and Frolich, The Case for Comparative Contribution in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. Rav. (1976).
24. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1981).
25. The Contribution Act reads: "[W]hen two or more persons become jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury ... there is a right of contribution among them." FLA. STAT. §
768.31(2)(a) (1983). This was judicially recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in Lincenberg
v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 392 (Fla. 1975). For a criticism of the supreme court's treatment of
joint and several liability in Lincenberg, see Comment, supra note 21, at 747.
26. "Judgment-proof" third parties who may be immune from contribution claims include
employers (via workers' compensation) and other entities which have traditionally been insulated from liability such as state and federal governments, charitable hospitals, etc. For a discussion of these issues, see Pulliam, ComparativeLoss Allocation and the Rights and Liabilities of Third PartiesAgainst an Immune Employer: A Modest Proposal, 31 FEz'N INs. CouNs.
Q. 80 (1980). Analysis of Florida law is included in Note, Right of Contributionis Not Barred
by Doctrine of InterspousalImmunity in Florida, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 167 (1979).
27. See Zavos, supranote 9, at 802-08. Professor Zavos suggests that the perception of the
plaintiff as non-culpable does not bear out in situations involving comparative fault. Zavos argues that in a risk-ridden situation, the plaintiff has many times created a hazard of the same
or equal magnitude to the defendant, who may have only fortuitously avoided injury. Id. at 808.
28. See generally Schwartz, Comparative Negligence in Kansas - Legal Issues and Probable Answers, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 397 (1974).
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relative fault should his co-defendants be unable to contribute. 29
One commentator suggests that the above distinction is not always well-founded given the realities of a risk-ridden encounter and
its practical implications."' For example, a plaintiff who fails to stop
at a four-way intersection. creates the same proportionate risk as defendants who may have illegally passed through the same intersection and who also may have sustained some injuries in the resulting
accident. Yet the plaintiff, who has initiated suit, will reap the benefits of joint and several liability.3 ' Even if the defendants have sustained no injuries, all parties, including the plaintiff, have negligently
created a risk factor. Allowing recovery in favor of the party initiating suit circumvents the central policies of the comparative negligence doctrine, which are founded upon equitable principles of pro2
portionate liability.

IV.

FLORIDA'S STATUTORY PROPOSAL

Often joint liability requires one to pay more than his proportionate share of the total injury simply because of his status as a defendant. 3 The contributorily negligent plaintiff in this situation essentially receives a windfall at the expense of a defendant who must pay
in excess of the amount for which he is legally responsible. 4 The is29. See Zavos, supra note 9, at 807-08.
30. The plaintiff's proportionate liability does not translate into a realistic assumption
which concludes that if plaintiff had not been negligent, he would have suffered only those
damages represented by defendant's proportionate liability. The interdependence of the parties' negligence is a nonallocable cause of the total injury and it is impossible to hypothesize
what the plaintiff would have suffered absent his own negligence. Id. at 808-09.
31. Where the defendant bears a portion of the plaintiff's damages caused by a third
party and the plaintiff himself has contributed to those damages, the defendant cannot request
contribution from the plaintiff because of his position as "defendant" within the litigation. See
id. at 810. Professor Zavos attributes this fallacious distinction to the court's inability to "view
the entire loss as separate from the particular label affixed to the parties ('defendant' or 'plaintiff')." Id.
32. The reluctance of American courts to apportion damages based upon fault percentages perhaps evolved from the nature of joint tortfeasors. Joint and several liability was justified among independent concurrent tortfeasors because the plaintiff's injury was regarded as
"indivisible." With the advent of comparative negligence and the contemporary statutes permitting contribution among tortfeasors, this concept has become increasingly less persuasive.
Analyses of these doctrines which focus on the plaintiff's injury are no longer academically
sound given modern-day realities. Courts should now look to the parties' conduct in view of the
circumstances and the policy issues which would best effectuate a sounder tort system.
33. See supra note 27.
34. Florida allows for contribution only to the extent of the contributing tortfeasor's proportionate share. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1976) reads:
The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his
pro rats share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount
paid by him in excess of his pro rats share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribu-
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sue then is which negligent party should bear the cost of an uncollectible judgment.3 5 The recent proposal introduced during the 1983
session of the Florida legislature places the burden of the tortfeasor's
insolvency or unavailability on the plaintiff's shoulders. This proposal, Senate Bill 1017, would apply only when the plaintiff is comparatively negligent. 7 The proposal exacts from each party, including the
plaintiff, only his percentage of negligent conduct which caused the
injury. Thus, joint liability is eliminated and the doctrine of proportionate several liability emerges. 8
The elimination of joint liability among multiple tortfeasors in
cases involving comparative negligence furthers the policy considerations which originally fostered the implementation of comparative
fault.3 Since several liability requires each party to carry his own

burden in accordance with his respective liability, 40 neither plaintiff
tion beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.
Thus, if claimant recovers the total amount of his damages from defendant A, that defendant
may sue for contribution against defendants B and C. If defendant C is insolvent, defendant A
must bear that portion also, since defendant B is required only to contribute his proportionate
liability.

35. To the extent that the plaintiff is innocent, joint and several liability insures his fiscal
recovery. Difficulties relative to equitable apportionment arise when the plaintiff has contributed to his own injuries, or, as illustrated in supra note 34, multiple solvent tortfeasors are
required to share the risk of an uncollectible judgment.
36. FLA. S. 1017 (Reg. Seass. 1983, introduced by Sen. Kirkpatrick).
37. See supra note 19.
38. "Proportionate several liability" refers to the concept that each tortfeasor will be responsible only for his relative degree of fault. See generally Zavos, supra note 9. Strict application of the concept of proportionate several liability would eliminate the doctrine of joint and
several liability altogether. The proposed statute does not go that far, but eliminates the doctrine only in cases where the plaintiff has been found by the trial court to be comparatively
negligent. FLA. S. (Reg. Sess. 1983, introduced by Sen. Kirkpatrick).
39. The Florida Supreme Court enunciated the broad policy considerations advocating
implementation of comparative negligence in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)
when it stated:
If fault is to remain the test of liability, then the doctrine of comparative negligence
which involves apportionment of the loss among those whose fault contributed to the
occurrence is more consistent with liability based on a fault premise. ....
When the negligence of more than one person contributes to the occurrence of an
accident, each should pay the proportion of the total damages he has caused the other
party.
Id. at 436-37.
40. Both Senate Bill 1017 and FLA. STAT. § 768.31 consider relative degrees of fault, and
do not apportion damages on pro rata calculation based upon the number of defendants divided by the total damages. Florida's Contribution Act was amended to provide for calculation
based on relative degrees of fault. 1976 Fla. Laws 335 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a)
(1975)).
Courts have attempted to circumvent statutes providing for a strict pro rata calculation by
using theories such as "partial equitable indemnity" which allow contribution based on relative
degrees of fault. See Hummert, A Criticism of Judicially Adopted Comparative PartialIn-
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nor defendants receive any advantage at the other's expense. The
plaintiff's recovery is not totally barred because of his contributory
negligence, and he may recover those damages which do not represent his portion of liability. Accordingly, a solvent defendant is
still liable for his own negligent conduct, but is not liable for the negligence of an insolvent co-defendant. In effect, eliminating joint liability when the plaintiff is comparatively negligent merely shifts the
burden of the insolvent defendant from the solvent defendant to the
plaintiff. Simply stated, the proposed legislation favors the defendant
at the plaintiff's expense. 4 In this respect, however, Florida's proposed legislation is not unique.
Consonant with Florida's proposed legislation, some jurisdictions
approach the doctrine of joint and several liability from a dual standpoint.4 2 In these states, joint and several liability survives only in
non-comparative fault cases; that is, only where the plaintiff is not
culpable. Other jurisdictions 43 retain joint and several liability in
comparative negligence cases, but only when the plaintiff's comparative fault is less than that of each defendant.4 4 These courts find that
demnity as a Means of Circumventing Pro Rata ContributionStatutes, 47 J. AiR L. & COM.
117 (1982).
41. See Zavos, supra note 9, at 809-17 (discussion and analysis of the policy considerations involved in the elimination of joint and several liability relative to the lower court of
appeal's opinion in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1977), vacated, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978)).
42. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2), (B)(3) (Page 1981). These jurisdictions include Ohio, Oklahoma, and Kansas. Ohio's comparative negligence statute provides for
a modified system of recovery; plaintiff may not recover unless his negligence is less than that
of the aggregate defendants'. Upon determination of recovery, Ohio specifically provides for
proportionate several liability. See also Note, supra note 15, at 345.
By judicial fiat, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Laubach v. Morgan that Oklahoma's
legislative adoption of comparative negligence implied a rule of proportionate several liability.
588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). For an extensive discussion of this decision and its implications, see
McNichols, The Complexities of Oklahoma's ProportionateSeveral Liability Doctrine of Comparative Negligence - Is Products Liability Next?, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 195 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as McNichols, Complexities] and McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several
Liability Because of Comparative Negligence - A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
The Supreme Court of Kansas unequivocally established proportionate several liability
upon interpretation of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.258b (1976) in Brown v. Kiell, 224 Kan. 195, 580
P.2d 867 (1978). For a discussion of the concept implemented in Kiell, see Note, Multiple
Party Litigation Under Comparative Negligence in Kansas - Damage Apportionment as a
Replacement for Joint and Several Liability, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 672 (1977); Comment, Brown
and Miles: At Last, An End to Ambiguity in the Kansas Law of Comparative Negligence, 27
U. KAN. L. REV. 111 (1978).
43. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2325 (West Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3)
(1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1981); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).
44. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) which
provides:
Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the judgment
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the spirit of comparative fault presumes a doctrine of proportionate
several liability.45 The Florida Senate apparently agrees with this
principle. As previously indicated, inequities arise under this resolution because the loss of an uncollectible judgment is merely shifted
from several co-defendants to the plaintiff.46
To illustrate this potentially unjust result, assume a plaintiff
whose culpable portion of liability measures 10 percent. The solvent
defendant is adjudicated 30 percent negligent and the insolvent defendant 60 percent negligent. Under the new Florida proposal, the
plaintiff who is 10 percent negligent will only be compensated for 30
percent of his total damages. Because of this inequitable loss alloca-

tion, most courts faced with this issue retain joint and several liability in connection with comparative negligence.4 7 In addition, at least
awarded the claimant, except that a defendant whose negligence is less than that of the
claimant is liable to the claimant only for that portion of the judgment which represents
the percentage of negligence attributable to him.
45. Some courts have justified the plaintiff's plight under the proportionate several liability by reasoning that the doctrine of joint and several liability evolved to counteract the harsh
effects of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery. Thus, upon the adoption of
comparative negligence, the reasons for retaining joint and several liability are diminished. See
McNichols, Complexities, supra note 42, at 195-96; Zavos, supra note 9, at 810.
Two distinct reasons have been proffered for the adoption of comparative negligence. One
is to alleviate the harsh "all or nothing" effect of the doctrine of contributory negligence. See
McNichols, Complexities, supra note 42, at 195. Another reason, distinct from the former, is to
guarantee that "in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should
govern the extent of liability." Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1975).
Broad policy reasons as stated above, however, have only served to confuse, not clarify, the
law. As the common law evolves, lower courts attempting to interpret the similar language of Li
will inject conflicting law into an area which mandates consistency. See Fleming, Report to the
Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated
with American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1465 (1978).
46. The term "uncollectible judgment" in this note refers to that portion of the plaintiff's
damages which are unavailable for collection due to an insolvent or absent tortfeasor, a
tortfeasor immune from liability, or a tortfeasor's proportionate liability which has been extinguished either by release, settlement, or a covenant not to sue.
47. The majority of courts interpreting the effects of comparative negligence have retained joint and several liability. See Wheeling Pipe v. Edrington, 259 Ark. 600, 535 S.W.2d 225
(1976); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (1978); Dunham v. Kampman, 37 Colo. App. 233, 547 P.2d 263 (1975); Lincenberg v.
Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154 (1940);
Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979); Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297
N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 1980); Saucier v. Walker, 203 So. 2d 299 (Miss. 1967); Scott v. Rizzo, 96
N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Rice v. Hyster Co., 273 Or. 191, 540 P.2d 989 (1975); Seattle
First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978); Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); Caldwell v. Piggly-Wiggly Madison Co.,
32 Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966).
One of the major decisions in the area of comparative fegligence and joint and several
liability is American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (1978). In American Motorcycle, the plaintiff had suffered injuries in connection with
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seven jurisdictions have statutorily retained the doctrine of joint and
several liability in all comparative negligence cases.4 s
One alternative to this inequitable allocation loss would be to exonerate multiple tortfeasors from bearing the entire amount of damages only when the plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of the defendant's. 49 For example, assume a plaintiff is found 60 percent
negligent and two defendants are each found 20 percent negligent.
Under the comparative negligence doctrine, the plaintiff could recover only 40 percent of his total damages.5 0 Alternatively, if one of
the defendants is insolvent the solvent defendant would not be
jointly and severally liable for the 40 percent; instead he would pay
only his proportionate share of 20 percent.
This alternative, however, is inconsistent with Florida's system of
comparative negligence, which is premised on the notion that the
plaintiff's negligence should never bar recovery. Clearly, Florida adheres to the "pure comparative negligence" doctrine which permits
recovery even when the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the aggregate of
the defendants' negligence.' Consequently, any proposal tailored to
resolve Florida's problems concerning the interaction of joint and
several liability and comparative fault must be consistent with this
policy.
a motorcycle accident and sued the defendant association. Defendant attempted to cross claim
against the plaintiff's parents seeking complete indemnity in case of a finding of liability and
also seeking a declaration of relative fault, so that any finding of liability on the defendant's
part would be reduced by the parents' proportionate share of negligence. Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at
903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
The supreme court refused to abrogate the doctrine of joint and several liability even
though the plaintiff was found comparatively negligent. Id. The court ignored the statute which
provided for contribution based on a pro rats division, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875(c), 876(a)
(West 1980), and adopted a doctrine of "partial equitable indemnity." This doctrine essentially
permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors to be calculated proportionate to each defendant's relative culpability instead of on a pro rata basis. 20 Cal. 3d at 582-84, 578 P.2d at 90102, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85 (1978). For a discussion of this approach, see Zavos, supra note 9,
at 777-80. One Florida court recently recognized the inapplicability of the indemnity doctrine
to joint tortfeasors in City of Live Oak v. Sargent-Sowell, Inc., 413 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1982).
48. See IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (Supp. 1982); ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp.
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01, subd. 1 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West
1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); 9A UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(2) (1953); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-110 (1977).
49. This is the approach of Nevada, Texas, Louisiana, and Oregon. See supra text accompanying note 43.
50. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
51. Pure comparative negligence systems are accepted by most legal scholars as the more
equitable and sensible of the comparative fault sytems. The federal government, most common
law jurisdictions, and ten states have adopted the pure form. All states (save West Virginia)
which have judicially adopted comparative negligence have opted for the pure form. See V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 185-88 (Supp. 1981).
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UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
MODIFYING FLORIDA'S LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL: CONSIDERATION OF
THE UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has promulgated a comprehensive statutory scheme52 designed
to ameliorate the problems of loss allocation which have traditionally
accompanied the doctrine of joint and several liability. The proposed
Uniform Comparative Fault Act 53 modifies the doctrine of joint and
several liability by dividing uncollectible losses according to each
party's respective degree of fault.54 The prefatory comments 55 to the

Comparative Fault Act urge the adoption of "pure" comparative negligence rather than the modified versions in effect in many states.56
52.

UNn'. CoMPARATIVE FAULT AcT 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1984).

53. Id.
54. The Comparative Fault Act provides for apportionment of damages based on each
party's equitable share of fault, embodying the doctrine of comparative negligence (culpable
plaintiff) within its language. §§ 1 [Effect of Contributory Fault] -2 [Apportionment of Damages], 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1983). Losses which are designated as uncollectible are divided between all parties based upon their respective degrees of fault and collected and redistributed by
the court to the appropriate parties. § 2(c), (d) (Supp. 1983).
55. UN n. CoPARrTIVE FAULT AcT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1984) (Commissioners' Prefatory
Note). The Commissioners state concerning their proposal:
The language of the [various states'] statutes varies considerably, and the form adopted
often comes about as a result of a political compromise and without adequate consideration of the practical implications. This Uniform Act... serves two important purposes:
(1) it addresses the problems and provides what are regarded as the best solutions for
them, and (2) it provides the opportunity for creating a desirable uniformity throughout
the country.
Id. at 35.
56. The anomalous results stemming from the modified systems of comparative negligence are multiple. First, if both the plaintiff and the defendant have been injured, one party
must bear the full extent of the loss. To illustrate: the court determines that plaintiff has sustained $10,000 worth of damages and the defendant has sustained $5,000. The jury determines
that each party is equally culpable (50/50). If this is a jurisdiction which bars plaintiff's recovery unless he is less negligent than the defendant, the plaintiff bears his full $10,000 worth of
loss and the defendant must bear his own $5,000. Thus, for injuries totaling $15,000 for which
each party is equally culpable, one party bears two-thirds of that loss while the other bears only
one-third. Compounding this inequity would be a finding of negligence on the plaintiff's part of
51% and the defendant 49%. The plaintiff is barred from recovery (thus having to bear the full
amount of his loss), but the defendant, as cross-claimant, may recover from the plaintiff 51% of
his total damages of $5,000. The plaintiff bears his entire loss as well as part of the defendant's,
thus placing him in a worse position under a comparative negligence statute than would have
occurred had the doctrine of contributory negligence barred both parties' claims altogether.
Second, if there are multiple tortfeasors, the modified form can become very confusing if
the plaintiff's negligence is not measured against the aggregate negligence of all the defendants', but is instead measured against each defendant individually. Third, where doctrines
such as last clear chance (providing that if defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident, a contributorily negligent plaintiff may recover the full amount of damages) and strict
liability apply in full force, the plaintiff may benefit from being precluded from recovering a
portion of his damages under a modified comparative negligence statute since he can recover
the full amount of his damages under these doctrines.
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Because the Florida Supreme Court has already adopted "pure" comparative negligence, 57 Florida is ripe for legislative action under the
Comparative Fault Act. Additionally, the Act utilizes the term comparative "fault"58 rather than comparative "negligence." The term
comparative "fault" was used to clarify the Act's applicability to legal
fault concepts which do not necessarily involve strict definitional
negligence, such as products liability,5" strict liability, 0 worker's compensation,"1 and insurance subrogation and indemnity.2
Fourth, a single percentage point may preclude recovery altogether. With a small margin of
error having such a large effect, an equitable apportionment of fault is almost impossible. Juries
may begin reaching conclusions based on "greater than/less than" philosophies and then filling
in the exacting percentages. Arbitrary decision-making cannot further the policies of comparative fault. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1984) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note).
57. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
58. The Act applies only to physical harm to person or property. It does not include economic losses arising from contract interference, defamation or negligent misrepresentation. §
1(b), 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984). For a discussion of joint tortfeasors relative to torts of a contractual nature, see Coffey, supra note 23, at 971 n.2.
59. For discussion of products liability and the doctrine of comparative negligence, see
Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1974); McNichols, Complexities, supra note 42; Twerski, From
Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977); Wade, ProductsLiability and Plaintiff's Fault - The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978); Westra, Restructuring the Defenses to
Strict ProductsLiability - An Alternative to ComparativeNegligence, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
355 (1979). Westra proposes an expansion of the traditional defenses to strict products liability
arguing that plaintiff's recovery does not always further societal interests through allocation of
losses. Id. at 363-64. The author seems to propose a return to the concept of contributory negligence in some cases of strict products liability (i.e., assumption of risk) as an incentive for
behavior modification (ultimately resulting in more cautious individuals).
60. See Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Liability, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171
(1974) (advocating application of comparative negligence in strict liability cases).
61. Workers' compensation schemes have created substantial confusion in the area of contribution. In Florida, employers are immune from contribution to third party tortfeasors even if
the employers' negligent acts contributed to the employees' injuries. See Seaboard Coast Line
R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978). The Comparative Fault Act specifically excludes
workers' compensation schemes from its contribution provisions. UNIF. ConMARATIVF FAULT ACT
§ 6, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1984) (commissioner's comment). See Pulliam, ComparativeLoss Allocation and the Rights and Liabilities of Third PartiesAgainst an Immune Employer: A Modest Proposal, 31 FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 80 (1980).
62. In Florida, no claim for contribution is permitted against a tortfeasor who is released
from liability by virtue of an insurance settlement of the policy limit. Schreier v. Parker, 415
So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982). The insurance company usually retains the right of subrogation to its insurer's contribution rights against a third party tortfeasor. FLA. STAT. §
768.31(2)(e) (1976) provides:
A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a
tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer is subrogated to the
tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the
tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability. This provision does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
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A. Uncollectibility of Judgment
Because multiple defendants are now afforded contribution rights,
joint and several liability is equitable unless one joint tortfeasor is
either statutorily immune from judgment or financially insolvent. To
allocate this loss fairly, the Comparative Fault Act provides that all
negligent parties share the burden of the insolvent defendant.6 3 To
illustrate, suppose a 40 percent negligent plaintiff receives judgment
against two defendants for $100,000. Each defendant is 30 percent
negligent, but one defendant is insolvent. Under joint and several liability doctrine, the plaintiff could recover the full $60,000 from the
solvent defendant even though his proportionate liability is only 30
percent. Under proportionate several liability, the solvent defendant
is responsible only for his 30 percent, leaving the injured plaintiff to
bear 70 percent of the total judgment. Under the Comparative Fault

Act, however, both the plaintiff and the solvent defendant would
share the insolvent defendant's liability relative to their own proportionate liability.6 As a result, of the $30,000 owed to plaintiff from

the insolvent defendant, the plaintiff would bear approximately
$17,200 of the burden and the solvent defendant would bear approximately $12,800. This calculation is based on the 4:3 ratio representative of the solvent parties respective proportionate negligence.6 5
Concerning indemnity, Florida's Contribution Act provides:
This act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. When one tortfeasor
is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity
and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the
obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(f) (1983). See Walkowiak, Implied Indemnity: A Policy Analysis of the
Total Loss Shifting Remedy in a PartialLoss Shifting Jurisdiction,30 U. FLA. L. REv. 501
(1978).
63. The Act states:

(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in accordance with
the findings, subject to any reduction under Section 6, and enter judgment against each
party liable on the basis of rules of joint-and-several liability. For purposes of contribution under Sections 4 and 5, the court also shall determine and state in the judgment
each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the
respective percentages of fault. (d) Upon motion made not later than [one year] after
judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable
share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their
respective percentages of fault. The party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless
subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
Uw. CoMPARATiVE FAULT AcT, § 2(c)-(d), 12 U.LA 39 (Supp. 1984).
64. The Act provides for a determination of relative fault based on the nature of the
conduct and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages. § 2(b), 12
U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1984).
65. The commissioner's comment to the Act provides: "Reallocation takes place among all
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The equities underlying apportionment when comparative negligence applies are equally forceful when the plaintiff is not negligent.
For example, suppose three defendants (X, Y, Z) are found to be 30
percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent negligent, respectively, for damages totaling $100,000. The plaintiff could execute judgment for the
full amount against any one of the defendants under the present doctrine of joint and several liability. If plaintiff recovers $100,000 from
X, then X may recover from Y and Z the amount representing their
respective proportionate liability, and X pays only $30,000. If Z is
insolvent, however, he is unable to contribute his 40 percent share
and X is liable for $70,000, or 70 percent, of the total verdict. Under
Florida's contribution statute, defendant Y cannot be required to
contribute more than his proportionate share for which he has been
adjudicated liable."' This injustice is more fully realized by considering that the plaintiff could have executed judgment against Y, who
would then be liable for both his share and that of his insolvent codefendant, Z. In effect, the insolvent defendant's share is paid by
whomever the plaintiff fortuitously chooses. 7
Under the Comparative Fault Act, both defendants X and Y
would share the burden of Z's insolvency. The insolvent defendant's
40 percent share of negligence would be allocated in accordance with
a 3:3 ratio. Thus, each solvent defendant would pay $50,000, $20,000
of which represents the insolvent defendant's share.
At this juncture, it is important to note that joint and several liability is still viable. 8 The plaintiff, whether culpable or not, may still
execute the full judgment against the defendant of his choice. The
Comparative Fault Act places upon the paying defendant the burden
parties at fault [when the equitable share of the obligation of a party is uncollectiblel. This
includes a claimant who is contributorily at fault." § 2, 12 U.L.A. 59 (Supp. 1984) (commissioner's comment).
The concept of loss reallocation is not a novel one. See generally Fleming, supra note 18,
at 251-52, 267-68. For a current analysis on the Comparative Fault Act, see Miller, Extending
the FairnessPrinciple of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 14 PAc. L.J. 835 (1983).
66. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1981) provides that: "No tortfeasor is compelled to make
contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability."
67. It is this type of procedural permissiveness which works the inequities on multiple
defendants. See Note, Contribution Among Tort-feasors in Washington: The 1981 Tort Re-

form Act, 57

WASH.

L.

REV.

479 (1982).

68. The commissioner's comment provides: "The common law rule of joint-and-several
liability of joint tortfeasors continues to apply under this Act. This is true whether the claimant
was contributorily negligent or not. The plaintiff can recover the total amount of his judgment
against any defendant who is liable." UNIV. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp.
1984) (commissioner's comment: Joint and Several Liability and Equitable Shares of the Obligation). See also Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws - An
Analysis of Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343 (1980).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 8

19841

UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT

of collecting against the remaining tortfeasors each of their respective
shares of the total judgment. 9 If a defendant cannot pay, the court
must determine the uncollectible amount and reallocate that portion
among the parties according to the ratio formula as previously
illustrated.7 0
B. Absent Tortfeasor
Major difficulties arise in multiple tortfeasor cases when not all
tortfeasors are parties to the action. Various circumstances may result in an absent tortfeasor. The plaintiff may decide not to join one
or more of the tortfeasors. 1 Also the tortfeasor may be unavailable
for joinder, 2 or the absent tortfeasor's negligence may not become an
73
issue until the trial is underway.
Florida's proposed legislation provides that the jury shall determine each party's proportionate fault in comparative negligence cases
by considering the percentage of negligence attributable to each person whose negligence is at issue.7 4 Significantly, the proposal specifies
69. This is accomplished simply by virtue of enacting the contribution provisions. In this
regard, the conceptual dichotomy of plaintiff/defendant remains viable. See supra notes 27-30
and accompanying text.
70. The Act provides:
On motion . . . if [the court] finds that the obligation of either party is likely to be
uncollectible, [the court] may order that both parties make payment into court for distribution. The court shall distribute the funds received and declare obligations discharged
as if the payment into court by either party had been a payment to the other party and
any distribution of those funds back to the party making payment had been a payment
to him by the other party.
UNw. CoMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 3 [Set-off], 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1984).

The latter part of this language is a bit confusing. It appears to mean that the court's
intervention as a reallocation device does not effect the legal ramifications of contribution directly between the tortfeasors themselves.
71. In circumstances where the plaintiff has decided not to join a tortfeasor, and has executed a covenant not to sue in exchange for consideration, the Florida courts must reduce the
ultimate verdict awarded the plaintiff by the amount of the consideration pursuant to Florida's
Contribution Act. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(a) (1981). The provisions of the statute are found in
infra note 88.
72. This occurs when the tortfeasor is physically unavailable (death or whereabouts unknown), outside the jurisdictional ambit of the court, or protected under some type of legal
immunity, such as employer or interspousal immunity.
73. In this circumstance it is usual for either claimant or defendant to bring the absent
party into the suit via Florida's joinder provisions. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.180.
74. The proposed § 768.36(2) providing for the determination of relative fault reads:
If the negligence of more than one person is an issue, the jury shall return special verdicts... determining the percentage of negligence attributable to each of the persons
and determining the total amount of damages sustained by each of the claimants, and
the entry of judgment shall be made by the Court.
FLA. S. 1017 (Reg. Sess. 1983, introduced by Sen. Kirkpatrick).
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"persons" and not "parties." This would seem to indicate that regardless of whether an individual is an actual party to the action, his
negligence will be calculated for the purposes of determining plaintiff's recovery against the actual defendants. Under this interpretation, the plaintiff may be left without a remedy if the court finds the
absent tortfeasor's negligence was substantial.75 On the other hand, if
the plaintiff's recovery was based solely on the actual parties' negligence, the defendants would pay a disproportionate amount of damages when an absent tortfeasor's negligence contributed to the plain76
tiff's injuries.
The Comparative Fault Act provides that only the respective liabilities of the actual parties to the litigation will be considered." The
Commission's comments indicate this is a deliberate choice designed
to encourage joinder of all parties to the suit.78 If the parties know

that only their liability will be taken into account in determining 100
percent of the damages, they will have an incentive to join all possible tortfeasors. This effectuates the Act's purposes in several ways.
First, the non-culpable plaintiff will recover 100 percent of his dam75. This solution is perhaps the worst of the two, for the innocent plaintiff has no way of
recouping that loss representative of the absent tortfeasor's relative fault. In cases not involving
comparative negligence, it is unlikely that courts and legislatures will be receptive to this alter-

native. The Florida proposal seems to provide for consideration of absent tortfeasors' negligence (all parties), but only in cases involving comparative negligence. This approach appears
the most equitably sound. F.A. S. 1017 (Reg. Sess. 1983, introduced by Sen. Kirkpatrick).

76. In the case of a comparatively negligent tortfeasor, this method of proportionate risk
determination may result in inequities for the defendants. For instance, suppose claimant is
40% negligent and two other parties are each 30% negligent. The absent tortfeasor's relative
fault is at issue at least in determining the truth of the evidence (i.e., reconstruction of the
accident, etc.). A jury, given a circumstance of an injured albeit negligent, plaintiff and a solvent, negligent defendant, may simply shift that portion of the absent tortfeasor's fault onto
the defendant. This effectively allows the comparatively negligent plaintiff to recover the 60%
to which he is entitled, but does not call on him to share that burden of the "uncollectible"
amount with the defendant. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see generally, Note, supra
note 15; Comment, Torts: Comparative Negligence and Absent Parties, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 692
(1979).
77. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 2(a)(1)-(2), 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1984).
78. The commissioner's comment provides:
The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other persons who may have been
at fault with regard to the particular injury but who have not been joined as parties.
This is a deliberate decision. It cannot be told with certainty whether that person was
actually at fault or what amoumt of fault should be attributed to him,. . . or whether the
statute of limitations will run on him. . . . An attempt to settle these matters in a suit to
which he is not a party would not be binding on him. Both plaintiff and defendants will
have significant incentive ...

[t]he more parties joined .

.

. the smaller the percentage

of fault allocated to each.
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT

Am, § 2, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1984) (commissioner's comment:

Parties).
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ages879 while the defendants retain a contribution right against the
absent tortfeasor8 0 Second, the culpable plaintiff and the defendant(s) will want to minimize their percentage of fault by joining all
responsible parties.8 1 Third, if an absent tortfeasor's liability is considered in allocating liability, any contribution sought subsequent to
the suit would necessitate relitigation of the absent tortfeasor's proportionate fault. Relitigation is necessary since the absent party cannot be bound by a prior proceeding in which he had no chance to
participate. Moreover, a later decision may find the absent party
non-culpable or less negligent than was initially determined.
If an absent tortfeasor cannot be joined because he is unavailable,
one solution would be to nevertheless consider his fault in apportioning damages. That liability could then be apportioned among all negligent parties on a ratio formula like that used when a party is insolvent.8 2 The Commission finds this a viable, although unnecessary,
alternative. Its solution would simply be to consider only the actual
parties in apportioning damages, since the ultimate analysis would be
the same.8 3 Caution is a necessary predicate to this latter approach in
79. Retention of joint and several liability would insure recovery in all events. Under proportionate several liability, which presumes elimination of joint and several liability, the absent
tortfeasor's proportionate share would be allocated to the claimant. Consideration of liability
relative to only the parties to the suit eliminates this inequity, allowing plaintiff to recover his
rightful amount of damages, reduced only by the amount representing his own relative fault if
he is comparatively negligent.
80. Under Florida law, the defendant currently has several procedural mechanisms available to him in a suit for contribution. He may cross-claim against a co-defendant already a party
to the action. Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So. 2d 2, 10 (1st D.C-. 1978), aff'd, 389 So. 2d 1179
(Fla. 1980). Additionally, he may join a potential defendant by issuing a third party complaint
pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. § 1.180. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Petrik, 343 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1977). If the defendant chooses to wait until post-judgment, he has two alternatives.
First, he may file a motion for contribution in the trial court within 30 days following the date
of judgment. The Contribution Act provides that- "When a judgment has been entered in an
action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may
be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants, by
motion upon notice to all parties to the action." FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(b) (1981). Second, he
may bring a separate action, within one year, against a co-tortfeasor who was not a party in the
original action. As the Contribution Act provides: "[C]ontribution may be enforced by separate
action." FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(a), (c), (d)(1)-(2) (1981). See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Zack
Co., 374 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979).
The provisions for contribution enforcement under the Comparative Fault Act afford the
enforcing party substantially the identical rights as provided under the Contribution Among
Tortfeasor's Act. The language, however, is significantly more comprehensible. UNw.CoPARATr FAULT Ac'r § 5 [Enforcement of Contribution], 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1984).
81. See supra note 78.
82. The difficulties inherent in this approach are identical to those mentioned previously.
See supra notes 77-80.
83. The commissioners' comments relative to the textual statement are actually directed
toward parties who have legal immunity from liability. As stated previously, however, the term
"absent tortfeasor" refers to immune parties as well as to non-parties. See supra notes 71-73.
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cases involving comparative negligence. The plaintiff, although culpable, is often seen as the only victim. Invariably the absent tortfeasor's
culpability will be at issue at least as it relates to the liability of other
defendants. If juries must then disregard the absent tortfeasor's culpability in determining damages, their instinct may be to unconsciously allocate that uncollectible portion to the defendants. 4 Care
should be taken to adequately instruct the jury on the meaning of
comparative fault, and the significance of the risk factors created by
each party to the action."5
C. Settlement and Release
A distinct problem arises when one or more tortfeasors are released from liability by the plaintiff through a settlement agreement8" or a covenant not to sue."' The issue is the extent to which
the negligence of these tortfeasors should be considered in rendering
judgment against the remaining parties to the action. Under current
Florida law,88 when the plaintiff settles with a tortfeasor, the judgment against the remaining tortfeasors is reduced by the amount of
the settlement, not by the percentage of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate negligence. 9 For example, a plaintiff who suffers a $10,000
The Commissioner states that, relative to apportioning damages, "this same result is also
accomplished by leaving the immune party out of the action altogether." UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACr § 6, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1983) (commissioner's comment: Immunities).
84. For a discussion on the conceptual bias relative to plaintiff and defendant, see Zavos,
supra note 9, at 802-09.
85. Id. See Aiken, ProportioningComparativeNegligence - Problem of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 293 (1970).
86. A settlement is an agreement by which one party agrees to release the other in exchange for a specified amount. It is usually reached subsequent to the onset of litigation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
87. A covenant not to sue is usually given in exchange for some consideration. Under
Florida law, both settlements and covenants not to sue are treated as a release for the purposes
of allocating fault and determining contribution. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
88. The pertinent provisions of Florida's Contribution Act state:
When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith
to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful
death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability . . . unless its
terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and (b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom
it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5) (1981).
89. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(a).

See supra note 88. In many cases, no amount of consideration has been paid pursuant to a release of liability. This occurs when the plaintiff either dismisses his cause of action against the defendant or the court exonerates the defendant of all
liability. The result of these two situations are distinct. When the court determines that one
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loss settles with defendant A for $500. The court delivers a $10,000
judgment and determines that defendants A, B, and C were 40 percent, 30 percent, and 30 percent negligent respectively. The court
then reduces the damages by the settlement amount and enters judgment against defendants B and C for the remaining $9,500.
The purpose of reducing the claimant's damages by the settlement amount and not by the percentage representing the settling
tortfeasor's negligence is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation. s0 Florida's provision, however, is subject to abuse by plaintiffs.
A plaintiff could settle for a negligible amount with a tortfeasor
whose solvent assets are questionable but who bears most of the responsibility for plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff may refuse to settle in
good faith with the remaining tortfeasors whose well-secured assets
will guarantee recovery. Furthermore, in cases of settlement or release between the plaintiff and a co-defendant, an action for contribution is not permitted against the settling party 1
The Florida Contribution Act attempts to mitigate the likelihood
this
abuse by mandating that all settlements be made "in good
of
'
2
faith. ) The subjective analysis necessary for a determination of
good faith, however, renders successful challenges to the good faith
requirement highly improbable. s3 The Comparative Fault Act exdefendant is not liable, the judgment is final and no right of contribution exists. FLA. STAT. §
768.31(4)(f) (1981) provides: "The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the
several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among
such defendants in determining their right to contribution." The Florida Supreme Court has
determined, however, that the co-defendant may appeal the dismissal since otherwise he would
be left bearing the entire amount of the damages and the right of contribution substantially
affects his measure of culpability. Pensacola Interstate Fair v. Popovich, 389 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.
1980). If the plaintiff dismisses his claim, however, the co-defendant still retains the option of
issuing a cross-claim, thereby rejoining the dismissed tortfeasor. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.180.
90. For analyses of the effect of settlements and releases on contribution claims, see Adams, Settlements After Li: But is it "Fair"?,10 PAC. L.J. 729 (1979); Coffey, supra note 23, at
991-96; Halligan, Another Look at Consecutive Tortfeasors:Responsibility,Indemnity, Contribution, and Settlement, 70 ILL. B.J. 236 (1981); McNichols, Complexities, supra note 42, at
239-56 (exhaustive study on settlements, release and absent tortfeasors).
91. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(b) (1981).
92. Id. § 768.31(5).
93. Inconsistent interpretations of Florida's good faith requirement has led to anomalous
results among Florida's appellate courts. Part of the problem stems from the reluctance of the
courts to question settlement agreements which are disproportionately low in relation to the
entire judgment. It is difficult to discern whether the plaintiff has settled with the defendant
for collusive reasons or because he simply did not anticipate a higher judgment award. "Mary
Carter" agreements, where the plaintiff secretly settles with the defendant but proceeds to trial
with him as an adversary, have been held not to constitute a per se violation of the good faith
requirement. Frier's Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 355 So. 2d 208, 211 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978).
Some of the more startling decisions relative to good faith settlement agreement have resulted from the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977)
where the court permitted contribution against the plaintiff's spouse on the theory that the
spouse was a joint'tortfeasor even though he was immune from liability to the plaintiff under
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presses skepticism about the effectiveness of the good faith requirement e4 and instead mandates that the claimant's damages be reduced
in proportion to the settling tortfeasor's equitable share of liability. 5
In the preceding example, the plaintiff's $10,000 judgment would be
reduced by the settling tortfeasor's 40 percent negligent share. Thus,
the plaintiff would receive $6,000 and each defendant would be liable
only for his 30 percent -proportionate share. 98 This solution, however,
creates a disincentive to settlements. The plaintiff must settle at the
risk of virtual non-recovery should the settling tortfeasor's equitable
share of fault be more than the plaintiff initially anticipated.9 7 In the
case of a non-culpable plaintiff, this remedy seems particularly
unjust.
One alternative is to treat that portion of the settling tortfeasor's
equitable share as an uncollectible judgment, thus allocating that uncollected portion in accordance with each party's ratio of fault.9 8 Consider the previous example. Defendants B and C have each paid the
plaintiff $3,000. Since the plaintiff has already received $500 in settlement, he remains uncompensated for $3,500 of his $10,000 damage
award. This $3,500 could then be allocated among the remaining culpable parties in accordance with their fault ratio. Because defendants
B and C are equally at fault, they would each bear half of the $3,500.
Each defendant's total damages would then equal $4,750, $1,750 of
which represents the settling tortfeasor's uncollectible share. A comparatively negligent plaintiff would likewise share in this burden with
respect to his ratio of fault. This illustration furthers the policies of
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. Thus at least two courts have upheld settlements
between family members as barring a claim of contribution by the third party defendant who
undoubtedly paid the entire judgment. Fuqua v. General Motors Corp., 518 F. Supp. 1065
(M.D. Fla. 1981); Dudley Sports Co. v. Berry, 407 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981). But see
Sobik's Sandwich Shops v. Davis, 371 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).
94. The commissioners' comments provide that "While [only good faith contributions]
theoretically encourage[s] settlements, it may be unfair to the other defendants and if the
good-faith requirement is conscientiously enforced, settlements may be discouraged." UNHm.
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1984) (commissioner's comments: Effect of
Release on Right of Contribution).
95. The Act provides that: "[T]he claim of the releasing person against other persons is
reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable share of the obligation." Id.
96. The drafters of the Comparative Fault Act consider this alternative consonant with
the principles of proportionate fault. The official comments read: "Although [this solution] may
have some tendency to discourage a claimant from entering into a settlement, this solution is
fairly based on the proportionate-faultprinciple." Id.
97. Likewise the defendant settles at the risk that his settlement share will not exceed his
proportionate liability. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in release agreements relative to multiple tortfeasors, see the articles cited supra note 90.
98. It is unclear why the Comparative Fault Act does not embody this solution. For a
critique of the Act's approach and discussion of the alternative approach suggested in the text,
see Miller, supra note 65, at 835, 864-67 & n.173.
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the Comparative Fault Act by equitably allocating the risk of settlement among the parties, while maintaining to some degree the plaintiff's incentive to settle. 99
VI. CONCLUSION

Eliminating the doctrine of joint and several liability among multiple tortfeasors when the plaintiff is comparatively negligent unjustly allocates risk by favoring defendants over plaintiffs. Fairness
mandates that uncollectible judgments be apportioned among all
negligent parties according to their respective liability as determined
by their percentage and ratio of fault. This necessitates enactment of
a special statute 00 which alters the principle of joint and several liability regardless of whether comparative negligence applies.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act achieves these results to a
substantial degree. The time is ripe to revamp Florida's system of
recovery with respect to multiple tortfeasors and comparative negligence. The Florida legislature should take this opportunity to
restructure Senate Bill 1017 to attain a more balanced and equitable
result for all parties.
NANCY THoiNER

99. The example indicated in the text serves the purpose of retaining the principle of
proportionate risk allocation. The comparatively negligent plaintiff, however, may be more unwilling to settle if he knows that he must share the burden of that portion of the judgment not
extinguished by the settled amount in relation to the settler's liability. Because the plaintiff
usually maintains the dominant position in settlement negotiations, this may result in disproportionately high settlement requests with its attendant consequences of no settlement agreements. This could conceivably be offset, however, by leverage used by the negotiating defendant to settle low if he feels that the plaintiff will ultimately share in the loss allocation in
proportion to his [plaintiff's] respective fault.
100. Adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act with the settlement modifications
developed in this note would serve that purpose.
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